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Abstract—Electric storage units constitute a key element in the
emerging smart grid system. In this paper, the interactions and
energy trading decisions of a number of geographically distributed
storage units are studied using a novel framework based on game
theory. In particular, a noncooperative game is formulated between
storage units, such as PHEVs, or an array of batteries that are
trading their stored energy. Here, each storage unit’s owner can
decide on the maximum amount of energy to sell in a local market
so as to maximize a utility that reflects the tradeoff between the
revenues from energy trading and the accompanying costs. Then
in this energy exchange market between the storage units and
the smart grid elements, the price at which energy is traded
is determined via an auction mechanism. The game is shown
to admit at least one Nash equilibrium and a novel proposed
algorithm that is guaranteed to reach such an equilibrium point
is proposed. Simulation results show that the proposed approach
yields significant performance improvements, in terms of the
average utility per storage unit, reaching up to 130.2% compared
to a conventional greedy approach.
Index Terms—Electric storage unit, noncooperative games, dou-
ble auctions, energy management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modernizing the electric power grid and realizing the vision
of a “smart grid” is contingent upon the deployment of novel
smart grid elements such as renewable energy sources and
energy storage units [1]. In this respect, electric storage units
are inherently devices that can store energy, or extra electricity
available at participating customers. Deployment of storage
units in future smart grid systems faces many challenges at
different levels such as studying the impact of integrating
storage units on the grid’s operation, determining the required
grid infrastructure (communication and control nodes) to enable
smart energy exchange, and developing new power management
strategies [2]–[6]. The potential economic impact of deploying
energy storage units was explored in [7], which also studied the
feasible level of energy storage in the distribution system. The
possibility of having groups of controllable loads and sources of
energy in power systems was investigated in [8] which deployed
a distribution network of solar panels or wind turbines. In [9],
distributed resources are allocated by the provision of two-
way energy flow and a unified, operational value proposition
of energy storage is presented. Other related problems have
assessed the advantages of deploying and maintaining storage
units such as [10]–[18].
One main challenge pertaining to introducing energy storage
units within the smart grid is the analysis of the energy trading
decision making processes involving complex interactions be-
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tween the storage units (and their owners) and the various smart
grid elements. A game theoretic approach to control individual
sources/loads was adopted in [19], which enhanced the relia-
bility and robustness of a power system without using central
control. In [20], a new technique based on cooperative game
theory is proposed to allow wind turbines to aggregate their
generated energy and optimize their profits. Reactive power
compensation was studied in [21] using game theory with the
objective of optimizing wind farm generation. A strategic game
model was developed in [22] to analyze an oligopoly within
an energy market with various grid-level constraints. Trans-
mission expansion planning and generation expansion planning
were studied through a dominant strategy using three game-
theoretic levels in [23]. Using an IEEE 30-bus test systems,
a comprehensive approach to evaluate electricity markets was
presented in [24] to study the impact of various constraints on
the market equilibrium. Developing a distributed energy storage
system for transferring photovoltaic power to electric vehicles
as well as introducing efficient power management schemes
between storage units and the smart grid have been studied
in [5] and [10], respectively. However, little work seems to
have been conducted, from the storage units’ point of view, on
the energy exchange markets that arise due to the competition
among a number of storage units, each of which could belong to
a different customer and that can interact at different levels. Due
to the promising outlook of introducing energy storage units in
the smart grid, devising new schemes to model and analyze
the competition accompanying such energy exchange markets
is both challenging and desirable.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a new
framework that enables a number of storage units belonging
to different customers to individually and strategically choose
the amount of stored energy that they wish to sell to customers
in need of energy (e.g., other nodes or substations on the grid).
Compared to related works on smart grid markets [10], [13],
[20], [24], [25], our paper has several new contributions: 1)
we design a novel double-auction market model that allows to
incorporate power markets with multiple buyers and multiple
sellers; 2) in contrast to the classical single shot, static auction
models which assume that sellers have a constant amount to
sell, we have developed here a novel framework that combines
a double auction with a noncooperative game allowing the
sellers to strategically decide on the amount they put for sale
depending on the current market state, thus, yielding a dynamic
pricing mechanism; 3) we have developed new results on
the existence of a Nash equilibrium for games that exhibit a
discontinuity in the utility function due to the presence of an
underlying auction model, unlike the classical models that often
assume continuous utilities, and 4) we proposed a new learning
algorithm that is guaranteed to reach an equilibrium for a game
with two levels of interactions: a market based on auction theory
and a noncooperative game. We are particularly interested in
overcoming two key challenges: (a) introducing a new approach
using which the storage units can smartly decide on the energy
amount to sell while taking into account the effect of these
decisions on both their utilities and the energy trading price in
the market, and (b) developing and analyzing a mechanism to
characterize the trading price of the energy trading market that
involves the storage units and the potential energy buyers in the
grid. To this end, we model the competition between a number
of storage units that are seeking to sell their surplus of energy as
a noncooperative game in which the strategy of each unit is to
select a self-profitable amount of energy surplus to sell so as to
optimize a utility function that captures the tradeoff between the
economical benefits of trading energy and the related costs (e.g.,
battery life reduction, storage unit efficiency, or other practical
aspects). Then, a double auction mechanism is proposed to
determine the trading price that potentially governs the market
resulting from the interactions between the storage units and
energy buyers. This mechanism is shown to be strategy-proof
such that each buyer or seller has an incentive to be truthful in
its reservation bids or prices. For the studied game, we show
the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium and we propose
a novel algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Subsequently, we also show the convergence of the proposed
algorithm. Extensive simulations are run to evaluate and assess
the performance of the proposed game-theoretic approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the studied system model trading. In Section III,
we formulate the game and develop the underlying auction
mechanism. In Section IV, we introduce the concept of the
best response and describe our proposed algorithm. Simulation
results are presented in Section V, while conclusions are drawn
in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a smart grid system having a number of nodes that
are in need of energy. These nodes could represent substations
and/or distributed energy sources that are servicing an area
or group of consumers (e.g., loads, pumped-storage in hydro
plants). Here, we consider that a certain number,K , of the smart
grid elements is unable to meet their demand due to factors
such as intermittent generation and varying consumption levels
at the grid’s loads. In this respect, such K grid elements must
find alternative sources of energy by acquiring this energy from
other elements that have an excess of energy stored in an energy
storage unit. Thus, we consider that a number, N , of storage
units are deployed in the grid. In particular, all these N units
belong to customers that have an excess of energy that they
wish to sell. We let N and K denote, respectively, the sets of
all N sellers and all K buyers. In what follows, we use seller
to imply any storage unit i ∈ N and buyer to imply any smart
grid element k ∈ K. Our model generally involves several types
of electricity sellers and buyers.
Each buyer k ∈ K has a maximum unit price or reservation
Fig. 1. An illustrative example of the model studied.
bid bk at which it is willing to participate in an energy trade
with a seller. Since we focus on the storage units’ perspective
of the market, we assume that the buyers wish to buy a fixed
amount of energy xk. This models a scenario in which, over
a certain given time period, xk is imposed on the buyers from
the practical energy requirements of the users and customers.
We can also view xk as an average value of the amount of
additional energy demand that buyer k foresees for a certain
period of time. For the storage units, i.e., the sellers, each unit
i ∈ N can chose an amount of energy ai to sell such that:
ai ≤ Bi , (Ci,max −Di) (1)
with Bi being the maximum total energy that seller i wants
to sell in the market, Ci,max being the maximum storage unit
capacity, and Di being the energy that each storage unit i wants
to keep and is not interested in selling. For each seller i, we
define a reservation price si per unit energy sold, under which
seller i will not trade energy.
Given these buying and selling profiles of the various grid
elements, an energy exchange market is set up in which the
buyers seek to acquire energy so as to meet their demand while
the sellers, i.e., the storage units and their owners, seek to collect
revenues from selling their extra energy surplus. Here, all N
sellers and K buyers will interact so as to determine various
energy trading properties that include the quantities exchanged
and the price at which energy is traded. Unlike conventional
markets in which the sellers only control the reservation prices,
in our model, the storage units can also strategically choose the
maximum quantity of energy ai that they want to put for sale
in the market. The choice of a proper ai is directly dependent
on an inherent tradeoff between the potential profits that the
sellers foresees and the accompanying costs that relate to the
physical characteristics of the storage devices. Indeed, such a
tradeoff is a byproduct of the fact that frequently charging or
discharging storage devices is costly as it can lead to a reduction
in the storage device’s lifespan as well as to other practical
costs [6], [25], [26]. Hence, given the buyers’ set of bids and
energy requirements, the maximum energy amount ai that any
seller i decides to trade strongly affects both the gains/revenues
and cost of every storage unit in N as well as the trading price.
Fig. 1 provides an illustrative example of the model considered.
To analyze such an energy exchange market, we next propose a
new framework that builds on the powerful analytical tools of
game theory and auction theory.
III. A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO ENERGY TRADING
In this section, we first formulate a noncooperative game
between the sellers, and then study the proposed energy trading
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Symbols Description
N the total number of sellers
K the total number of buyers
i, j the serial number of sellers
k the serial number of buyers
si the reservation price of seller i
bk the reservation bid of buyer k
ai the action of seller i
xk the demand of buyer k
L the total number of participating sellers
M the total number of participating buyers
Ui the utility of seller i
a−i the sellers’ actions except seller i
p the trading price
q the sold energy
Q the energy exchange function of action
β the oversupply energy
mechanism using a double auction, also discussing its various
properties. The main notation is listed in Table I.
A. Noncooperative Game Model
The complex interactions and decision making processes
of the storage units are analyzed using the analytical tools
of noncooperative game theory [27]. In particular, we for-
mulate a noncooperative game in normal form, Ξ =
{N , {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N }, that is characterized by three main
elements: (a) a set N of sellers or players, (b) action or strategy
of each player i ∈ N which maps to an amount of energy,
ai ∈ Ai := [0, Bi], that will be sold, and (c) a utility function
Ui of each seller i ∈ N which reflects the gains and costs
from trading and selling energy. Before defining the utility
functions, we note that, in the game Ξ, the reservation price si
is not included as part of seller i’s strategy space. This implies
that the sellers must reveal their correct reservation price when
participating in the game. This consideration is motivated by
the fact that, when we determine the market’s trading price, as
explained in the next section, we will develop a truthful and
strategy-proof double auction mechanism that guarantees that
no buyer or seller can benefit by cheating or changing its true
reservation price or bid.
Given a certain strategy choice ai by any storage unit i ∈ N ,
the utility function can be characterized by:
Ui(ai,a−i) =
∑
k∈K
(pik(a)−si)qik(a)−f
(∑
k∈K
qik(a)
)
, (2)
where a is the N × 1 vector of all strategy selections, a−i :=
[a1, a2, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aN ]
T is the vector of actions se-
lected by the opponents of storage unit i, pik(a) is the price
at which energy is traded between seller i and buyer k, qik is
the quantity of energy exchanged from seller i to buyer k, and
f(·) is a function that reflects the cost of selling energy. As
previously mentioned, these costs depend on numerous factors
such as the physical type of the storage unit or the amount
of time the unit is put into charging or discharging modes.
Moreover, we note that f must be an increasing function of
the amount,
∑
k∈K qik(a), sold in total by storage unit i. Here,
the utility in (2) is also a function of the amount xk of energy
that every buyer k ∈ K must buy and of the buyers’ reservation
bids. However, for notational convenience, we have dropped this
dependence.
The goal of each storage unit i is to choose a strategy ai ∈ Ai
in order to maximize its utility as given in (2). For characterizing
a desirable outcome for the studied game Ξ, one must derive
a suitable solution for all N optimization problems that the
sellers need to solve. We can first see that, in (2), every vector
of strategies a selected by the sellers will yield different trading
prices pik(a). These prices are also a function of the reservation
prices of the sellers, the quantity bought, and the reservation
bids of the buyers or grid elements. Thus, prior to finding a
solution for the energy exchange game, we will first introduce
a scheme for characterizing the trading price.
B. Double Auction Mechanism for Market Analysis
The formulated game is useful to study the sellers’ inter-
actions. However, in order to find the prices at which energy
is traded, we must define suitable mechanisms using the rich
tools of double auctions [28] and [29]. Inherently, a double
auction is a suitable representation for a trading market that
involves multiple sellers and multiple buyers. For the proposed
game Ξ, applying a double auction is needed so as to derive
the trading prices, the quantities of energy traded, as well as the
number of involved sellers and buyers, given the chosen strategy
vector a (maximum quantities offered for sale), the reservation
prices si, ∀i ∈ N , the quantities xk to be bought, and the bids
bk, ∀k ∈ K.
When dealing with a double auction, the buyers and sellers
have to decide on whether to be truthful about their reservation
bids and prices, given: (i) the potential utility that they will
obtain as captured by the first term of (2), and (ii) the buyers’
potential savings
∑
i∈N (bk−pik)qik with qik being the quantity
bought by k from i. Here, our emphasis is on having a double
auction mechanism that yields, for any a, a solution that is
truthful and strategy-proof. A truthful auction is a scheme where
no seller i ∈ N can benefit by cheating about its reservation
price such as by misreporting it to s′i > si or s′i < si, and no
buyer k ∈ K will gain by under-bidding b′i < bi or over-bidding
b′i > bi. A strategy-proof solution is of interest as it guarantees
truthful reporting by all buyers and sellers.
With this in mind, for the proposed system, we develop a
double auction scheme that follows from [28] and [29]. In this
scheme, the first step is to sort the sellers in an increasing order
of their reservation prices such that, without loss of generality,
we have:
s1 < s2 < . . . < sN . (3)
The next step is to arrange the buyers in a decreasing order of
their reservation bids, as follows:
b1 > b2 > . . . > bK . (4)
We note that the orderings in (3) and (4) assume that whenever
two buyers or sellers have equal reservation prices or bids, one
can group them into a single, virtual buyer or seller.
Following this sorting process, the supply curve (sellers’ price
si as a function of the energy amount ai, ∀i ∈ N ) and the
demand curve (buyers’ bids bk as a function of the amount of
required energy xk, for all k ∈ K can be generated. These two
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Fig. 2. An illustrative example on solving a double auction
curves will subsequently intersect at a point that corresponds
to a given seller L and a certain buyer M with bM ≥ sL. This
intersection point is easily computed using known numerical
and graphical techniques [28]. Once we determine the seller
L and buyer M at the supply and demand intersection point,
double auction theory implies that L − 1 and M − 1 buyers
will practically participate in the market and the energy trading
process. Here, as shown in [29], we must exclude seller L and
buyer M from the market so as to guarantee that the total
supply and demand will match while ensuring a strategy proof
and truthful auction mechanism. However, if one does not need
to maintain truthfulness, the proposed approach can easily be
modified so as to allow seller L and buyer M to also trade
energy.
Therefore, in order to match the supply and demand, all sell-
ers whose indices are such that i < L and all buyers such that
k < M will be part of the double auction trade. To determine
the trading price, once the intersection is identified, one can
select any suitable point within the interval [sL, bM ] [28]. For
our energy market, given a seller’s strategy vector a, we assume
that all sellers i < L and buyers k < M will exchange energy
at a price p¯(a) such that:
p¯(a) =
sL + bM
2
. (5)
Here, the price depends on a since, for every maximum energy
to sell vector a, the intersection point of demand and supply
may occur at different M and L.
This solution of the double auction is illustrated in Fig. 2,
which shows the supply (solid line) and demand (dashed line)
curves. The intersection of these two curves can be used to
determine the trading price and the quantities. Once the trading
price and quantities are determined from the double auction, the
next step is to define a proper utility function and introduce the
strategic operation for the proposed game.
Once the trading price is found, we need to find the amount
of energy that is traded between the L−1 sellers and the M−1
buyers. First, given the unified trading price in (5), the L − 1
sellers will be indifferent between buyers. This implies that, at
the double auction solution, each seller’s utility in (2) depends
only on the quantity sold but not on the identity of the buyer
who bought this amount. Hence, assuming that the cost function
f(·) is quadratic, by using the proposed double auction, (2)
becomes:
Ui(ai,a−i) = (p¯(a)− si)Qi(a)− τiQ
2
i (a), (6)
with Qi(a) being the total quantity of energy sold by i and τi
being a penalty factor that weighs the costs reaped by storage
unit i when discharging/selling energy. Here, we must stress
that our analysis can accommodate any type of cost functions
f .
Once the auction is concluded, different approaches can be
applied to find the quantity of energy traded between each
of the L − 1 participating sellers and M − 1 participating
buyers [28]. For our work, we will apply the technique of [29]
where the entire volume traded is divided in a way to maintain
the truthfulness of the auction. Using this approach, the total
amount Qi(a) that is sold by any storage unit i, for a given
strategy vector a is:
Qi(a) =
{
ai if
∑M−1
k=1 xk ≥
∑L−1
j=1 aj ,
(ai − βi)
+ if
∑M−1
k=1 xk ≤
∑L−1
j=1 aj ,
(7)
where (α)+ := max(0, α) and βi represents the fraction of the
oversupply
∑L−1
j=1 aj −
∑M−1
k=1 xk that is allotted to seller i.
The mechanism in (7) implies that whenever the total demand
at the auction’s outcome exceeds the supply, then every seller i
would sell all of the energy ai that it introduced to the market.
However, when the total supply exceeds the total demand, then
all sellers get an equal share of the oversupply’s burden. Here,
βi =
∑L−1
j=1 aj−
∑M−1
k=1 xk
L−1 . Nonetheless, if, for a seller i, we have
(
∑L−1
j=1 aj−
∑M−1
k=1 xk)
L−1 > ai, then, seller i does not sell any energy
as per the second case in (7). The remaining “oversupply”
(
∑L−1
j=1 aj−
∑M−1
k=1 xk)
L−1 − ai of this seller is subsequently divided
equally between the other L− 2 sellers and the result is added
to their share βj , j < L, j 6= i. This scheme will be repeated
as long as each seller sells a nonnegative quantity. Here, for
the “oversupply” case, the total energy put in the market by the
participating sellers,
∑L−1
j=1 aj , is greater than or equal to that
requested by the buyers,
∑M−1
k=1 xk , but the real energy obtained
by seller k is the expected energy, and thus mathematically,∑
i qik = xk. For the “over-demand” case, the amount of energy
requested by the buyers exceeds the amount put into the market
by the sellers, that is,
∑
i qik < xk. An analogous process can
be carried out to find the amount bought by the grid’s elements
or buyers. Using (7), as shown in [28] and [29], we will have:
Lemma 1: In the proposed game Ξ, by using (7), no seller or
buyer benefits by cheating about its reservation price si, ∀i ∈ N
or reservation bid bk, ∀k ∈ K. The double auction is thus
strategy-proof or truthful.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION AND ALGORITHM
Any storage unit i ∈ N can use the proposed double auction
in order to estimate its utility, as per (6), for every ai given
the strategy choices a−i of its opposing players. Each seller
seeks to maximize its utility by selecting the proper strategy
ai ∈ Ai. In order to solve a noncooperative game in normal
form such as Ξ , one popular solution is that of a Nash
equilibrium [27]. A Nash equilibrium is a state of the game such
that no player can increase its utility by unilaterally deviating
from this equilibrium state. Formally, the Nash equilibrium is
defined as follows [27]:
Definition 1: Consider the proposed noncooperative game in
normal form Ξ = {N , {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N }, with Ui given by
(6) given the underlying double auction. A vector of strategies
a
∗ is said to be at a Nash equilibrium (NE), if and only if, it
satisfies the following set of inequalities:
Ui(a
∗
i ,a
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(ai,a
∗
−i), ∀ai ∈ Ai, i ∈ N . (8)
Next, we first prove the existence of an NE for the proposed
game and, then, we propose an algorithm that could find an NE
for our model. Before going through our analysis, we first point
out that, in general, the existence of an NE is not guaranteed
for any noncooperative games. In particular, when the strategy
spaces Ai, ∀i ∈ N are compact such as in our proposed game
Ξ, the existence of an NE is contingent upon having a utility
function in (6) that is continuous in ai [27]. However, in our
game, the double auction process introduces a discontinuity in
the utilities in (6) due to the dependence on the trading price.
Showing the existence of NE for a discontinuous utility function
is known to be more challenging than the classical case in which
the utility is a continuous function [27]. Nonetheless, for the
proposed game, we can obtain the following existence result:
Theorem 1: For the noncooperative game Ξ =
{N , {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N }, there exists at least one pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Assume Ai ⊆ Rm(i = 1, . . . ,N ), is a non-empty,
convex and compact set. As shown in [30], if ∀i, Ui : A → R1
is 1) graph-continuous 2) upper semi-continuous in a 3) quasi-
concave in ai, then the game Ξ = {N , {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N }
possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
A function Ui is said to be graph continuous if there exists a
function Ai = Fi(A−i), ∀a ∈ A such that Ui(Fi(a−i), a−i) is
continuous in a−i. In particular, as shown in [30], a piecewise
continuous function is graph continuous if the strategy space is
compact. Due to the discontinuity of our utility function as a−i
varies, we define
p¯(ai,a−i) = p1,
p¯(ai,a−i +∆a) = p2.
(9)
at a jump point. Thus, we can assume that in a given range ∆a,
p¯(ai,a−i) =
p2 − p1
∆a
∆a−i, (10)
and when ∆a is a small value, the slope becomes infinite, which
implies that the function is a piecewise continuous function on
a−i.
Mathematically, Ui(ai,a−i) is upper semi-continuous at ai0
if there exists a neighborhood ai such that
lim
ai→ai0
supUi(ai,a−i) ≤ Ui(ai0,a−i). (11)
Similarly, for a jump point of utility function, we define ai0 =
ai +∆a such that p3 ≤ p4,
p¯(ai,a−i) = p3,
p¯(ai0,a−i) = p4.
(12)
Clearly, the utility function is upper semi-continuous because
rational players seek a higher profit around the jump point. Here,
we only need to prove that the utility function is quasi-concave.
In a given range of constant price, by simplifying (6) and (7),
we have:
f(Q) = (p¯− si)Q−Q
2,
Q(a) =
{
ai, if
∑M−1
k=1 xk ≥
∑L−1
j=1 aj ,
(ai − βi)
+, if
∑M−1
k=1 xk ≤
∑L−1
j=1 aj ,
Ui = f(Q(a)).
(13)
Before proceeding further with the proof, we need to state the
following Lemma from [31]:
Lemma 2: Suppose g : X → R is quasilinear and h :
g(X) → R is a quasi-concave function. Then h ◦ g : X → R
is quasi-concave.
This result has been extended to concave functions with strict
conditions in [31]. Now,
∂Q(a)
∂ai
≥0,
Q(λaxi + (1− λ)a
y
i ,a−i) ≥min[Q(a
x
i ), Q(a
y
i ),a−i],
Q(λaxi + (1− λ)a
y
i ,a−i) ≤max[Q(a
x
i ), Q(a
y
i ),a−i],
∀ axi 6= a
y
i , λ ∈ (0, 1),
(14)
where axi and a
y
i belong to the action set Ai of seller i. Thus,
Q(a) is both quasi-concave and quasi-convex, and hence it is
a quasi-linear function. Subsequently we can obtain the partial
derivative with respect to Q from (13):
∂U(Q)
∂Q
=p¯− si − 2Q,
U(λQx + (1 − λ)Qy) ≥λU(Qx) + (1− λ)U(Qy),
∀ Qx 6= Qy, λ ∈ (0, 1).
(15)
Thus, U(Q) is a concave function (which is quasi-concave).
Following Lemma 2, we substitute (14) into (15),
U [Q(λaxi + (1 − λ)a
y
i ,a−i)]
≥U [min{Q(axi ,a−i), Q(aiy , ,a−i)}],
≥min{U [Q(axi ,a−i)], U [Q(aiy ,a−i)]}.
(16)
Thus, U is a quasi-concave function of ai.
Intuitively, the partial derivative of U on Q is positive before
the local maximum of U and negative after it. The partial
derivative of Q on ai is 1 or a nonnegative number depending
on the auction except at the inflection point when ai = βi.
Around this inflection point, U(ai,a−i) firstly increases then
might decrease as ai varies in a price-holding graph-continuous
range. Therefore, U(a) is a quasi-concave function in a, and the
game Ξ = {N , {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N } possesses a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium as it satisfies all required conditions.
At any NE of the proposed game, no storage unit can improve
its utility by unilaterally changing the maximum quantity of
energy that it wishes to sell, given the equilibrium strategies of
the other storage units. Having established existence, we must
develop a scheme that allows to reach an NE of the game Ξ.
To do so, we must first define the notion of a best response:
Definition 2: The best response r(a−i) of any storage unit
i ∈ N to the vector of strategies a−i is a set of strategies for
seller i such that:
r(a−i)={ai ∈ Ai|Ui(ai,a−i) ≥ Ui(a
′
i,a−i), ∀a
′
i ∈ Ai}. (17)
Hence, for any storage unit i ∈ N , when the other storage
units’ strategies are chosen as given by a−i, any best response
strategy in r(a−i) is at least as good as any other strategy in
Ai. Using the concept of a best response, we can subsequently
define a novel algorithm that can be used by the storage units
and buyers so as to exchange energy. In particular, we propose
the following iterative algorithm that is guaranteed to converge
to a Nash equilibrium of the game:
Theorem 2: There exists a searching inertia weight w, 0 <
w < 1, such that, the iterative algorithm
a
(n+1)
i = (1− w)r(a
(n)
−i ) + wa
(n)
i , (18)
converges to an NE.
Proof: In the proposed model, the classical best response
dynamics may not converge due to the underlying auction
mechanism. Depending on the different amounts between sellers
and buyers, the price is a piecewise continuous function. From
(6) and (17), we have:
r(a−i) = argmax
ai
[(p¯(a)− si)Qi(a)− τiQ
2
i (a)],
=


p¯(a)−si
2τi
,
if
∑L−1
j=1 a
(n)
j ≤
∑M−1
k=1 xk, (sell≤buy);
(p¯(a)−si)(L−1)+2τi(
∑L−1
j=1,j 6=i aj−
∑M−1
k=1 xk)
2τi(L−2)
,
if
∑L−1
j=1 a
(n)
j ≥
∑M−1
k=1 xk, (sell≥buy).
(19)
When selling amounts are less than buying, the best response
of each seller is a constant. When selling amounts are greater
than buying, and, we only use best response for iterations, we
have
a
(n+1)
i =
1
L− 2
L−1∑
j=1,j 6=i
a
(n)
j +Gi, (20)
where Gi = (p¯(a)−si)(L−1)2τi(L−2) −
1
L−2
∑M−1
k=1 xk. To sum all L−1
sellers,
L−1∑
1
a
(n+1)
i =
L−1∑
1
a
(n)
i +
L−1∑
1
Gi. (21)
The second term on right hand side is not 0 and this might lead
a price change. In other words, in iteration γ,{
if
∑M−2
k=1 xk ≤
∑L−1
j=1 a
(γ)
j ≤
∑M−1
k=1 xk, p¯(a) = p1(sell≤buy),
if
∑M−1
k=1 xk ≤
∑L−1
j=1 a
(γ)
j ≤
∑M
k=1 xk, p¯(a) = p2(sell≥buy).
(22)
It is possible that, in iteration γ +1, the best response changes
the total amount
∑
a
(γ+1)
i in (21) and this can lead to a price
changing loop.
However, from (6) and (17), our proposed algorithm in (17)
has
a
(n+1)
i = wa
(n)
i + (1− w)
1
L− 2
L−1∑
j=1,j 6=i
a
(n)
j + (1− w)Gi. (23)
Similarly, to sum over all L− 1 sellers,
L−1∑
1
a
(n+1)
i =
L−1∑
1
a
(n)
i + (1− w)
L−1∑
1
Gi. (24)
In particular, when n > γ, we have (24). Thus, there must exist
a weight w, such that{
if
∑M−2
k=1 xk ≤
∑L−1
j=1 a
(γ+1)
j ≤
∑M−1
k=1 xk, p¯(a) = p1(sell≤buy),
if
∑M−1
k=1 xk ≤
∑L−1
j=1 a
(γ+1)
j ≤
∑M
k=1 xk, p¯(a) = p2(sell≥buy).
(25)
Remark 1: We note that the above result is generated for
the case in which the (L − 1) sellers are able to sustain the
oversupply. Similar results can easily be generated for the cases
in which the oversupply cannot be split among all sellers;
however, this case is omitted due to space limitations.
Remark 2: With a given price range, the utility in (6) can
be viewed as a concave function. More precisely, there exists a
weight, such that no player could arbitrarily approach its current
best response, which might change the price and pull some
participating players out of the auction.
In a given price range,
if ∂Ui
∂ai
> 0,
U(a
(n+1)
i ,a
(n)
−i )− U(a
(n)
i ,a
(n)
−i )
a
(n+1)
i − a
(n)
i
> 0,
if ∂Ui
∂ai
< 0,
U(a
(n+1)
i ,a
(n)
−i )− U(a
(n)
i ,a
(n)
−i )
a
(n+1)
i − a
(n)
i
< 0.
(26)
An increasing/decreasing monotonic function would approach
to its upper/lower boundaries. It is not difficult to obtain the
upper boundary from concavity:
U(a
(n+1)
i ,a
(n)
−i ) ≤ U(a
(n)
i ,a
(n)
−i ) +
∂Ui
∂ai
(a
(n+1)
i − a
(n)
i ). (27)
For the lower boundary,
U(a
(n+1)
i ,a
(n)
−i )
=U(a
(n)
i ,a
(n)
−i ) +
∂Ui
∂ai
(a
(n+1)
i − a
(n)
i )
−
∫ a(n+1)
i
−a
(n)
i
0
∂Ui(a
(n)
i ,a
(n)
−i )
∂a
(n)
i
t−
∂Ui(a
(n)
i + t,a
(n)
−i )
∂(a
(n)
i + t)
t dt.
(28)
In particular, because ∂Ui
∂ai
is Lipschitz continuous when the
weight holds the price in a range,
||
∂Ui(a
(n)
i ,a
(n)
−i )
∂a
(n)
i
−
∂Ui(a
(n)
i + t,a
(n)
−i )
∂(a
(n)
i + t)
|| ≤ L||a
(n)
i − (a
(n)
i + t)||.
(29)
Thus, we have
U(a
(n+1)
i ,a
(n)
−i ) ≥U(a
(n)
i ,a
(n)
−i ) +
∂Ui
∂ai
(a
(n+1)
i − a
(n)
i )
−
1
2
L(a
(n+1)
i − a
(n)
i )
2
.
(30)
Remark 3: The upper and lower boundary of
U(a
(n+1)
i ,a
(n)
−i ) are also bounded by (22).
Due to the above-mentioned price and boundary analysis, we
can conclude that |a(n+1)i − a
(n)
i | < ε after some iterations γ,
where ε is a small value. Substituting in (18), we obtain (at the
final iteration):
(1− w)a
(Tf+1)
i =(1− w)r(a
(Tf )
−i )
a
(Tf+1)
i =r(a
(Tf )
−i ),
(31)
TABLE II
PROPOSED ENERGY TRADING SOLUTION
Phase 1 - Proposed Dynamics:
Each storage unit i ∈ N chooses a starting strategy ainiti = Bi
repeat,
a) Each seller i ∈ N observes its best response strategy ri(a−i)
b) Each seller i ∈ N randomly selects the better response strategy
between the current strategy and best response strategy in (18):
wai+(1−w)ri(a−i) , where 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. As using the method:
a) An auctioneer (utility operator) communicates with
the buyers and sellers using the grid’s two-way communication
architecture (see [32] or [6] and references therein).
b) The price and amounts of energy to be traded are
found via the double auction of Section III-B.
Auction
a) The auctioneer advertises si, ∀i ∈ N and bk ∀k ∈ K.
b) Each seller publishes its expected price, and the
auctioneer orders the sellers as required.
c) After ordering, the auctioneer tells seller i, during
its turn, of the current vector of strategies a−i.
d) Seller i computes and submits its strategic response in
(18) using (17).
until convergence to an NE strategy vector a∗.
Phase 2 - Market and Trading
a) The auctioneer performs the double auction mechanism
given the equilibrium choices as per a∗.
b) Actual energy exchange occurs and revenues are collected.
which is the best response of a(n)i . Consequently, our algorithm
converges to an NE.
Determining the precise computational complexity for the
proposed approach is challenging due to the fact that the trading
price varies during the iterative process, which subsequently
leads to a varying number of participating sellers. However,
we can obtain some insights on the computational complex-
ity by assuming a constant trading price p¯(a) in (19). The
computational complexity for comparing the amount sold by
sellers with the energy requested by the buyers in (19) is
O(L+M), where seller L and buyer M determine the trading
price (see Fig. 2). In this respect, if assume that the trading
price does not change, the amount of computation required
to calculate p¯−si2τi in (19) is O(1) since this value is indepen-
dent of the market size. The computational complexity needed
for calculating (p¯−si)(L−1)+2τi(
∑L−1
j=1,j 6=i aj−
∑M−1
k=1 xk)
2τi(L−2)
in (19) is
O(L+M). This represents the individual seller’s computational
complexity for the proposed sequential algorithm. As we have
(L − 1) participating sellers, if the trading price is a constant,
the total computational complexity of the proposed sequential
algorithm is O
(
(L− 1)(L+M)
)
. For the parallel algorithm,
the proposed approach would require a lower computational
complexity, O(L+M), but then it will lead to more iterations
than in the sequential case as seen from Fig. 3.
The sellers and buyers in the proposed noncooperative game
can interact using a novel algorithm composed of two phases:
a strategic dynamics phase and an actual market and energy
trading stage. Our strategic dynamics stage begins with every
seller choosing an initial strategy ainiti . While this initial strategy
can be chosen arbitrarily by each seller, the most intuitive choice
is that each seller starts by trying to sell all of its available
surplus of stored energy. Therefore, we let ainiti = Bi, ∀i ∈ N .
Subsequently, an iterative process begins in which the sellers
can take turns in choosing their maximum amount of energy
to sell (i.e., strategies). To this end, at any iteration θ, any
storage unit i, during its turn to act, will choose a strategy
that approaches its best response strategy, as given by (17)
and (18). This iterative algorithm is executed until guaranteed
convergence to an NE. In particular, the proposed algorithm
has been shown to always converge to a Nash equilibrium in
Theorem 2. A summary of the proposed algorithm is given in
Table II. Here, we note that, although in Table II we present
a sequential implementation of the algorithm, the players may
also utilize a parallel approach. In a sequential implementation,
the players act sequentially, in a arbitrary order such that each
player is able to observe (or is notified by the auctioneer) the
actions taken by the previous players. In contrast, in a parallel
approach, at an iteration t, all players respond, using (18), to
the actions observed by the other players at iteration t−1. Once
an NE of the game is reached, the last phase of the algorithm
is the practical market operation. During this final phase, given
the equilibrium strategies, all sellers and buyers submit their
bids and then engage to an actual double auction in which each
storage unit discharges (sells) the desired energy amount and is
rewarded accordingly.
One possible approach to determine w is to gradually lower
its value from 1 until a suitable value guarantees reaching
an NE. This weight essentially ensures that the price, which
introduces the discontinuity, is bounded within a certain range
after a certain number of iterations. Determining this weight
depends on the various buyers/sellers parameters. The control
center of the utility company needs to dynamically determine a
weight and change it if needed using time-dependent informa-
tion observed from the participating users. At the beginning,
the control center could start with an initial weight (either
arbitrarily or chosen based on historical data), and set a periodic
time to dynamically adjust the weight. The control center can
gradually and periodically optimize the current weight to meet
the observed network environment. One possible strategy is to
follow a classical bisection method [31]. The application of this
method helps the control center adjust the speed of convergence.
At each step, the center divides the weight interval into two. A
subinterval is selected depending on whether an NE could be
effectively obtained or not. The center would use a previous
subinterval as a new interval in the next step and this process is
continued until the interval is sufficiently small and convergence
is guaranteed. Nonetheless, we have to stress that we have
proven that there exists a weight w, 0 < w < 1 such that
the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to converge to an NE,
and thus, in practice, control center will eventually reach this
weight, as the range within which the weight varies is finite.
For practical implementation, the utility company’s control
center acts as an auctioneer [28] that guides the energy market
and monitors the interactions of the storage units. This auction-
eer utilizes a storage-to-grid communication network such as in
[32] or [6] (and references therein) to communicate with all grid
elements and storage units. Thus, the auctioneer plays mainly
two roles: (a) sorting out the sellers and the buyers once bids
are received, as per (3) and (4) and (b) gathering their strategies
whenever they must act during the dynamics phase. At a given
iteration t during Phase I of the proposed approach, any seller
must compute its utility in (2) so as to update its strategy. The
strategy update can be based either on the current state (for the
sequential algorithm) or on the state of the grid in the previous
iteration (for the parallel implementation). For enabling this
strategy update, the auctioneer and the storage units interact
over the communication infrastructure using either an open or
a private method. In the open method, when interacting with
a certain seller, the auctioneer conveys the current opponents
strategy vector a−i, the reservation bids, and the type of auction
being implemented. Once this information is obtained, the
seller can calculate its best strategy using classical optimization
techniques [31] and pursue the proposed auction procedure.
The disadvantage of the open method is that the auctioneer
must disclose the current strategies and reservation prices/bids
to the sellers. In many cases, it is of interest to keep this
information private. Hence, alternatively, when an auctioneer
communicates with a certain seller i, this seller will submit a
restricted set of potential strategies A¯i ⊂ Ai for the current
iteration. Then, the control center feeds back the trading prices
and amount of energy that seller i will potentially obtain at the
current time, for each of the submitted strategies. Using this
data, each seller i builds, using function smoothing methods
such as in [33], an estimate of its utility under the current
strategies, and, subsequently, find the optimal strategy response
for this iteration using optimization methods. For this private
implementation, the sellers do not require any knowledge on the
type of auction being used nor on the strategies and reservation
prices of their opponents (or the bids of the buyers). In addition,
the control center does not require any knowledge of the
utility functions that are being used by the players. The only
information that would circulate, as dictated by the method,
would be the trading price and the energy sold for any potential
strategy ai submitted by any seller i to the auctioneer during
its turn.
We finally note that, in the presence of an elaborate commu-
nication infrastructure, the sellers and the buyers can interact
directly without the need for a control center. In this case,
each seller can, individually, decide on the amount of energy it
wants to sell at each iteration of the proposed approach, while
directly notifying the other players of its choice. The rest of
the operation would still follow the iterative process discussed
earlier.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulating the proposed system, we consider a geograph-
ical region in which a number of storage units have a surplus
of stored energy that they wish to sell to existing customers
(e.g. loads, substations, etc.) in a smart grid. Each unit has a
surplus between 75 MWh and 220MWh that can be sold. The
reservation prices of the sellers are chosen randomly from a
range of [10, 50] dollars per MWh while reservation bids of the
buyers are chosen randomly from a range of [15, 60] dollars
per MWh. The demand of each buyer is chosen randomly from
within a range of [20, 60] MWh. Unless stated otherwise, the
cost per energy sold is set to τi = 0.5, ∀i ∈ N . All statistical
results are averaged over all possible random values for the
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Fig. 3. Average action per seller (storage unit) resulting from the proposed game
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Fig. 4. The ending double auction market performance of storage units K =
5 buyers, N = 6 based on sequential iterations.
different parameters (prices, bids, demand, etc.) using a large
number of independent simulation runs.
In Fig. 3, we show, for a smart grid with K = 5 buyers
and N = 6 sellers, the average action per seller (storage unit)
resulting from the proposed game approach at the equilibrium
using both sequential and parallel approaches. The sequential
algorithm’s performance is compared with that of the parallel
algorithm in which the sellers, simultaneously, attempt to sell
energy depending on their previous actions. Here, in particular,
we choose the same weight w = 0.3 for both the sequential
and the parallel algorithms. In Fig. 3, we can see that, for
the proposed algorithm, the trading action per storage unit
converges to different values with increasing iterative steps.
Fig. 3 shows that two players out of six decide not to participate
in the market. The brown line relates to those sellers who do
not participate in the market due to the fact that would the
trading price would then lead to a negative utility. However,
these sellers would still have some energy in hand and they can
offer it for sale at a later time instant in which the trading price
in another auction or area might give them an opportunity to
obtain positive utility. Thus, although they do not trade at the
current market price, they will maintain their available energy
and eventually participate in a future market. In particular, we
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Fig. 5. Performance assessment in terms of average utility per seller as the
number of storage units N varies for K = 3,K = 5 buyers.
use the “brown line” to indicate a baseline action value of 1 to
represent those sellers that do not participate in the market, but
rather prefer to wait for future trading opportunities. We can
also observe that, for the sequential algorithm (solid line), the
action of player 1 increases a little at the beginning. This is due
to the fact that, the player who plays first in one iteration has
a higher opportunity to sell energy than others. In general, as
seen in Fig. 3, because of the competition over the resources,
the actions are essentially decreasing, which means that at the
equilibrium, not all players will sell their maximum available
energy.
Given the same setting as in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 shows the
price resulting from the double auction phase for the case of
the sequential algorithm. In this figure, the intersection point
demonstrates that seller 5 and buyer 2 determine the trading
price. The total amount sold by participating sellers (seller 1 to
4) is equal to the demand of participating buyers (buyer 1 and
2). If the solid and dashed lines intersect at a point of the 3rd
buyer (the 3rd range of the dashed line), seller 5 and buyer 3
lower the trading price. Although all four participating sellers
might sell more than before, the associated reduction in the
trading price will lead to lower revenues.
Fig. 5 presents, for a smart grid with K = 3, 5 buyers, the
average achieved utility per seller resulting from the proposed
game as the number of storage units N varies. Here, we set
w = 0.5 for the sequential algorithm and w = 0.1 for the
parallel algorithm. For comparison purposes, we develop a
conventional, baseline greedy algorithm using which, iteratively,
each seller tries to sell the maximum amount that it could
sell (while accounting for the changes of the utility in (6))
while first picking the highest-bid buyers. The greedy process
continues until no additional energy trade is possible. In this
greedy scheme, the trading prices are selected as the middle
point between the concerned buyer’s reservation bid and the
concerned seller’s reservation price. In Fig. 5, we can see
that the average utility per storage unit is decreasing with
N . The reason behind it mainly involves two aspects. First,
the increase in sellers can lead to an increased competition
and, thus, a decrease in the overall trading price. Second, the
number of sellers L − 1 < N that will actually participate in
the final energy exchange market reaches a certain maximum
that no longer increases with N due to the fixed demand
(i.e., the number of buyers). This figure demonstrates that, at
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Fig. 7. Average number of action per seller resulting from the proposed game
approach as the number of storage units N varies for K = 5 buyers.
all N , the proposed noncooperative game approach yields a
significant performance improvement, in terms of the average
utility achieved per storage unit. In particular, this advantage of
the proposed approach reaches up to 130.2% (the maximum at
K = 5, N = 4) relative to a conventional greedy approach.
Fig. 6 shows, for K = 5 buyers, the average number of
iterations needed before convergence of the different algorithms
as the number of storage units N increases. In this figure,
we can see that the average number of iterations of the pro-
posed sequential algorithm is similar to that of the classical
best response algorithm (whenever this algorithm converges,
recall from Theorem 2 that a best response dynamics may not
converge). As expected, Fig. 6 shows that the parallel algorithm
requires a much higher number of iterations. In particular,
the average number of iterations resulting from the sequential
algorithm varies from 7.7 at N = 6 to 8.2 at N = 7, in contrast,
for the parallel case, it varies from 25.8 at N = 4 to 32.5
at N = 10. This result indicates that the proposed algorithm,
particularly with a sequential implementation, has a reasonably
fast convergence speed.
Fig. 7 shows for K = 5 buyers, the average action per seller
for both the sequential and the parallel algorithms as the number
of storage units N grows. We can see that the average action
per player resulting from both the sequential and the parallel
algorithms is greater than that of the greedy strategy. Thus,
using the proposed algorithm provides the sellers with more
incentives to trade larger amounts in the markets. This is in
fact further reflected in the enhanced utility achieved by the
proposed approach, as seen in Fig. 5. Finally, Fig. 7 also shows
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that the sequential and the parallel algorithms converge to nearly
the same actions at the equilibrium.
Fig. 8 shows, for different buyers and sellers, the average
utility per seller as the penalty factor τ varies. From (6), we
can see that the utility would decrease with increasing τ and
this is corroborated in Fig. 8. In particular, when τ is equal
to 1, the utility of each player is dramatically influenced by
the penalty part in (6). The first revenue term in (6) the sellers
obtained in the auction remains the same as the second penalty
term increases, even though the total utility is positive.
Fig. 9 shows the average utility from the different proposed
approaches as the number of buyers K varies, for N = 6
sellers. Each iteration consists of a series of choices by the
sellers, using the same initial information. In Fig. 9, we can
also see that, as the number of buyers, K , increases the average
utility per seller increases due to the availability of additional
buyers that are willing to participate in the market. In fact, Fig. 9
shows that, as K increases, the sellers have a larger utility due
to the availability of more buyers. In particular, our proposed
algorithm yields a performance improvement ranging between
72.3% (for K = 4, N = 6) to 234.4% (for K = 10, N = 6)
relative to the greedy scheme. Further inspection of Fig. 9
reveals that any change in the numbers of buyers does not
impact the increasing average utility rate of our algorithm, while
the greedy algorithm reaches a maximum when the number of
buyers are similar to that of sellers.
Fig. 10 shows, for a smart grid with K = 3 buyers and
N = 4 sellers, the state of charge represented by the battery
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Fig. 11. Performance assessment in terms of the amount of Player 2 as the
number of runs varies for comparing with underlying batter limitation.
amount per player resulting from a time-dependent game as time
evolves. Here, we show the results for the proposed sequential
algorithm with a weight w = 0.5, without loss of generality.
For our simulations, we assume that the period corresponds to 1
hour as is typical in a residential community [34]. In Fig. 10, we
can see that, for the proposed game, four sellers would sell their
energy in the market during the first time instant. Then, after the
first run, all players reconsider their roles and still participate
in the market, especially for those who did not sell/buy enough
in the previous time slots. The iteration would then lead to a
new trading price and this process continues, as previous users
are still in the market and no new players join in this group. In
Fig. 10, we can see that all players have an opportunity to act
as sellers or buyers every hour. Player 1, for example, acts as
a buyer during the first hour. After the second hour, this player
changes from a buyer to a seller, and then acts as a buyer at
the fifth hour. Player 4 sells a small amount in the first three
hours and becomes a seller at the fourth and sixth time instants.
During the second and third hours, Player 2 does not sell a large
amount despite the fact that it had acted as a buyer and fully
charged at the first time instant. After 4 hours have elapsed,
Player 2 sells 12.8 MWh. This player tends to sell the energy
because it reaches its battery limitation and has an incentive to
become a seller after the first hour.
In Fig. 11, we show how the amount of energy in Player 2’s
battery changes within this player’s minimum and maximum
battery capacity. In this figure, we can see that Player 2 reaches
its maximum battery size capacity two times. Correspondingly,
this player acts as a seller twice at the second and fourth
hour. In contrast to Players 3 and 4, Player 2 frequently uses
its storage unit so as to obtain potential utility through time-
dependently buying/selling energy. In essence, Fig. 11 shows
how the proposed game can be used to handle the battery
limitations of the users as well as their time-dependent behavior.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a novel approach for
studying the complex interactions between a number of storage
units seeking to sell part of their stored energy surplus to
smart grid elements. We have formulated a noncooperative
game between the storage units in which each unit strategically
chooses the maximum amount of energy surplus that it is willing
to sell so as to optimize a utility function that captures the
benefits from energy selling as well as the associated costs.
To determine the trading price that governs the energy trade
market between storage units and smart grid elements, we have
proposed an approach based on double auctions, which leads
to a strategy-proof outcome. We have shown the existence of
a Nash equilibrium and studied its properties. Further, to solve
the underlying game, we have proposed a novel algorithm using
which the storage units can reach a Nash equilibrium point for
our model. Simulation results have shown that the proposed
approach enables the storage units to act strategically while
improving their average utility. For future work, it is of interest
to extend the model to a dynamic game model in which all
players could time-dependently observe each others’ strategies
as well as the grid’s state and dynamically determine their
underlying actions. In this respect, the work done in this paper
serves as a basis for developing such a more elaborate dynamic
game model in which players can make long-term decisions
with regard to their energy trading processes.
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